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BOOK REVIEW 
LAWRENCE M. FRIEDMAN' 
THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS. By 
DAVID P. FORSYTHE. Lexington, Mass.: Lexington Books. 1991. 
Pp.211. 
Before World War II, international law provided little recourse 
to citizens mistreated by their own state governments. Humanitarian 
intervention by other countries was rare, and was often motivated 
by economic or political concerns, rather than an interest in human 
rights. The end of the Second World War, however, signalled a 
change in the face of international human rights law.' The extent 
of Nazi atrocities startled the world, creating a desire to prevent 
such crimes against humanity in the future. 2 Toward this end, new 
international structures and standards for the promotion and pro-
tection of human rights were developed, primarily through the 
United Nations, the U.N. Charter and the Universal Declaration of 
Human Rights. 
Today, the promotion and protection of international human 
rights appear to be at an important juncture. On the one hand, the 
dissolution of the Soviet Union and Soviet bloc spells an end to 
some of the worst human rights offenses, and a recognition that 
rights violations can no longer be rationalized away by citing Marxist 
ideology.3 There remains, however, great frustration with interna-
tional law and its perceived inability to protect effectively basic 
human rights in many countries. The horrible abuses still being 
committed in Central and South America, in many Asian countries 
and in South Africa, attest to the fact that while progress has been 
made since World War II, there is still much that can-and should-
be done . 
• Executive Editor, BOSTON COLLEGE THIRD WORLD LAW JOURNAL. 
1 Louis B. Sohn, The New International Law: Protection of the Rights of Individuals Rather 
Than States, 32 AM. U. L. REV. I, 9-10 (1982). 
2/d. In addition to creating international standards of human rights, many nations 
engaged in efforts to bring Nazi persecutors to justice. See Ronnie Edelman et aI., Prosecuting 
World War II Persecutors: Efforts at an Era's End, 12 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 199, 199-230 
(1992). 
3 David P. Forsythe, Human Rights in a Post-Cold War World, 15 FLETCHER FORUM OF 
WORLD AFFAIRS 55, 56 (1991). 
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Attempting to make sense of all that has transpired in the 
human rights field in recent years, and what is likely to happen in 
the future, is David P. Forsythe's The Internationalization of Human 
Rights.4 Forsythe gives substantive meaning to the issues, and sur-
veys recent interpretive literature.5 He shows through several in-
depth treatments that the subject of international human rights can 
be explored from "several different angles: the global, the regional, 
the national, the private transnational, and the individual."6 Finally, 
the author speculates about the different ways the movement for 
international human rights may be understood. 7 
The book is thus divided into sections which encompass "civil, 
political, economic, social, cultural, legal, historical, philosophical, 
and other phenomena in an untidy mix."B Forsythe wisely creates 
no illusions about providing a thorough and complete treatise on 
the subject of human rights. Instead, he hopes to offer "some 
advance in understanding, however imperfect."9 The first section 
of the book provides essential background for the ensuing discus-
sion, as Forsythe addresses the basic definition and standards of 
human rights. 1o Here, he considers how human rights have been 
defined in the past, and how today's definition and standards strug-
gle with the argument that they represent cultural imperialism by 
the Western powers. ll 
In the second section, Forsythe moves to the international po-
litical arena, looking at the role of international law and intergov-
ernmental organizations such as the United Nations. 12 Next, he 
focuses on regimes and hegemonic influences on human rights 
development, using the Organization of American States as a case 
study.13 The fourth section explores human rights from a national 
perspective, using the United States as an example, and focusing 
especially on the Carter and Reagan presidencies. 14 The fifth section 
4 DAVID P. FORSYTHE, THE INTERNATIONALIZATION OF HUMAN RIGHTS (1991) [hereinafter 
INTERNATIONALIZATION]. Forsythe, a professor of political science at the University of Ne-
braska-Lincoln, is also the author of HUMAN RIGHTS AND U.S. FOREIGN POLICY: CONGRESS 
RECONSIDERED (1988), and HUMAN RIGHTS AND WORLD POLITICS (2d ed. 1989). 
5 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at vii. 
6Id. 
'Id. 
BId. at 181. 
9Id. at vii. 
10ld. at 1-32. 
ll/d. 
12Id. at 33-86. 
19Id. at 87-118. 
14/d. at 119-42. 
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examines the role of nongovernmental organizations, such as the 
International Red Cross, and their role in advancing international 
human rights. 15 
In addition to his broad overview of human rights develop-
ments of the past fifty years, the value of The Internationalization of 
Human Rights lies in the new spin Forsythe gives to traditional 
arguments over human rights. He provides an intriguing and sub-
stantive examination of cultural imperialism, as well as discussing 
the global developments toward recognizing individual standing to 
bring human rights cases. In addition, Forsythe offers trenchant 
criticism of the United States and its failure to take a leadership 
role in the field of international human rights. 
I. INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS AND CULTURAL IMPERIALISM 
The discussion of cultural imperialism begins with Kenya in 
1990, where the one-party government consistently arrested and 
sometimes mistreated those demanding the creation of new par-
ties. 16 Kenyan President Daniel Arap Moi argued that the imposition 
of international standards of human rights was a form of cultural 
imperialism inappropriate for application to African states. 17 Africa 
is not alone in rejecting an international standard of human rights; 
many East and Southwest Asian nations also reject the notion. IS 
Because the international standard of human rights contradicts 
their cultural and religious heritage, states like Kenya and Saudi 
Arabia may never adopt internationally recognized human rights. 19 
Commentators who embrace this position espouse cultural relativ-
ism. The cultural relativists assert that judgments are based on 
experience, and each society's experience is intimately linked to its 
particular culture.20 Individual rights, they say, "are a Western in-
vention inappropriate to nonindividualistic cultures."21 
Forsythe counters these arguments with what he calls the "pol-
itico-legal record."22 This record consists of many elements, includ-
ing the positive law of the world's nation-states, combined with the 
15Id. at 143-70. 
16Id. at 2. 
17Id. 
18 See id. 
19Id. at 3. 
20 Abdullahi A. An-Na'im, Religious Minorities Under Islamic Law and the Limits of Cultural 
Relativism, 9 HUM. RTS. Q. 1,4 (1987). 
21 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 4. 
22Id. 
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empirical proof of political scientists.23 On the legal side, he notes 
the existence in international law of jus cogens, those human rights 
that are nonderogable and trump all other state action, including 
positive law.24 Forsythe also takes account of the actual practices of 
states. His empirical argument covers much of the same ground, 
examining universal human rights according to evidence in inter-
national instruments, like the International Bill of Rights,25 as well 
as public policy. 
The core, nonderogable rights that Forsythe lists are basically 
no different from those rights recognized under customary inter-
national law as binding all nations. 26 Forsythe's list includes freedom 
from: 
violent attacks on persons for money or sex (derived from pir-
acy), slavery and related practices, torture, summary execution, 
mistreatment, starvation, hostage taking (derived from aerial 
hijacking and the laws of war), racism, and major war crimes.27 
He acknowledges that other human rights, such as freedom of 
religion, may be no less important, but that evidence of such rights 
in the "politico-legal record" is somewhat weaker than evidence of 
the core rights. 28 
23 See id. 
24 Id. at 17. Jus cogens are peremptory norms, principles of international law so compelling 
that they "are recognized by the international community for the purpose of invalidating or 
forcing revision in norms of treaty or custom in conflict with them. For example ... states 
ought not be able to agree to enslave a minority people, to liquidate a race, [or] to brutalize 
dissidents .... " Gordon A. Christenson, Jus Cogens: Guarding Interests Fundamental to 
International Society, 28 VA. J. INT'L L. 585, 586 (1988). 
25 The International Bill of Rights consists of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, 
G.A. Res. 217 A(III), U.N. Doc. A/810 at 71 (1948), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS IN INTER-
NATIONAL LAW AND WORLD ORDER 298 (Burns H. Weston et aL eds., 1990) [hereinafter BASIC 
DOCUMENTS]; International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A(XXI), 
U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 52, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1966), reprinted in BASIC 
DOCUMENTS, supra, at 376; International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 
G.A. Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966), 
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra, at 371. 
26 Customary international law binds all nations, regardless of whether a state is a party 
to a particular human rights agreement. THEODOR MERON, HUMAN RIGHTS AND HUMANITAR-
IAN NORMS AS CUSTOMARY LAW 3 (1989). 
27 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 12. Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF THE 
FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES (1987), § 702, which states that a country 
violates customary international law if it practices, encourages or condones: genocide; slavery 
or slave trade; the murder or causing the disappearance of individuals; torture or other 
cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment; prolonged arbitrary detention; sys-
tematic racial discrimination; or a consistent pattern of gross violations of internationally 
recognized human rights. 
28 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 12. 
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Forsythe offers a final argument against cultural imperialism, 
citing the appeal of the idea of human rights in non-Western polities 
like the People's Republic of China.29 There, people desire basic 
human rights, as evidenced recently by the 1989 pro-democracy 
demonstrations in Beijing's Tiananmen Square.30 Chinese citizens 
demanded fundamental civil and political rights, even though they 
had not been educated in the Western tradition. Nor were their 
demands the result of any Western compulsion.31 Forsythe con-
cludes that the worldwide acceptance of the core fundamental hu-
man rights makes their Western origins basically irrelevant.32 
The author is careful, however, not to be too optimistic about 
the status of international human rights standards. He does not 
embrace the view shared by some commentators, who believe that 
all of the rights enumerated in the Universal Declaration of Human 
Rights have become a part of customary international law.33 And 
he points out that there is still much work to be done at the inter-
national level. 
II. INDIVIDUAL STANDING 
Along the lines of increased attention to human rights at the 
international level, Forsythe explores the developing role of the 
individual with respect to modern international law. Increasingly, 
he says, "states are restricted by the role of the individual as an 
entity recognized by international law and possessing rights, with a 
29Id. at 13. John Lewis Gaddis has similarly observed that after educating their popu-
lations in order to "compete in a global economy," authoritarian governments discovered 
that "the act of educating them exposed their minds to the realm of ideas and ultimately 
worked to undermine the legitimacy of authoritarianism itself." John L. Gaddis, Toward the 
Post-Cold War World, FOREIGN AFFAIRS, Spring 1991, at 104. 
30 See Jeffrey A. McCredie, Human Rights in the People's Republic of China: An Appraisal of 
Recent Events, 3 TEMP. INT'L & COMPo L.J. 217, 217-18 (1989). 
31 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 13. 
32Id. at 14. As historian Arthur Schlesinger Jr. has written, the "great liberating ideas 
of individual dignity, political democracy, equality before the law, religious toleration, cultural 
pluralism, [and] artistic freedom" evolved from the Western tradition, but "empower people 
of every continent, color, and creed" and are ideas "to which most of the world today aspires." 
Arthur Schlesinger Jr., Was America A Mistake? THE ATLANTIC, Sept. 1992, at 27-30. 
33 See, e.g., Richard B. Bilder, The Status of International Human Rights Law: An Overview, 
in INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LAW AND PRACTICE I, 8 (James C. Tuttle ed., 1978) 
(standards set by the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, although initially only declar-
atory and non-binding, have by now ... become binding customary law); Sohn, supra note 
I, at 16-17 (the Declaration "has become a basic component of international customary law, 
binding all states ... "). 
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corresponding duty by states to respect them."34 Forsythe points to 
the example of the Council of Europe, and the parties to the Eu-
ropean Convention on Human Rights.35 Individuals living in states 
party to the Convention have direct standing in front of the Euro-
pean Human Rights Commission, and indirect standing, through 
the Commission in front of the European Court of Human Rights.36 
A similar arrangement exists with the Organization of Ameri-
can States. There, individuals have standing with the Inter-Ameri-
can Commission on Human RightsY The Commission is empow-
ered to take individual cases to the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights, provided the state involved has submitted itself to the 
Court's jurisdiction.38 
In the United Nations, the U.N. Human Rights Committee is 
authorized, under an optional protocol to the International Cove-
nant on Human Rights, to hear individual petitions about human 
rights abuses.39 At least one domestic court has also granted indi-
viduals a legal right of action where injuries under customary in-
ternationallaw are involved.40 Governments are, as Forsythe notes, 
"increasingly obligated to respect human rights, and individual pro-
cedural capacity is widespread even if individuals lack the full sub-
jectivity or legal personality accorded to other actors."41 Simply put, 
human rights are no longer exclusively a matter of domestic juris-
diction.42 
The situation remains, however, that only states have standing 
in front of international tribunals such as the International Court 
of Justice (ICJ).43 And because of jurisdiction problems (only a 
handful of nations have submitted to compulsory jurisdiction of the 
court), the ICJ has heard few cases concerning human rights. For-
sythe claims that certain human rights "remain inviolable even in 
times of a national emergency threatening the life of a nation, and 
34 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 37. 
35Id. 
MId. 
37Id. at 38. 
38 Id. 
39 Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. 
Res. 2200(XXI), U.N. GAOR, 21st Sess., Supp. No. 16 at 59, U.N. Doc. Al6316 (1967), 
reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, supra note 25, at 386. 
40 See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 877-90 (2d Cir. 1980). 
4. INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 47. 
42 See id. 
43 Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 34(1), reprinted in BASIC DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 25, at 33. 
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the claim to national emergency is subject to an international review 
process .... "44 One questions whether this claim is a bit too opti-
mistic; while it is theoretically true that most states recognize the 
core, nonderogable rights, in practice the international review pro-
cess has had little impact. 
The regional system in Europe works well because the Euro-
pean countries share common interests. At the international level, 
however, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
has yet to be ratified by a majority of states, and even fewer states 
have ratified the optional protocol. 45 The Political and Civil Rights 
Covenant has been ratified by states from across the geo-political-
cultural spectrum; hope remains that it will one day become appli-
cable to all nations. 
III. THE ROLE OF THE UNITED STATES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF 
INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS 
If more serious attention to international human rights is to be 
given, the effort must inevitably be led by state actors. To this end, 
Forsythe serves appropriate criticism upon the United States for its 
failure in recent years to become a leader in international human 
rights. The United States has acted in "the contemporary area to 
block or retard some international measures designed to improve 
implementation of human rights."46 For example, lack of United 
States leadership in the Organization of American States has pri-
marily been the result of a Cold War preoccupation with the poten-
tial spread of communism.47 Though often asserting its power in 
security and economic matters, the United States has been unwilling 
to playa larger role in shaping a human rights agenda.48 
When the United States has acted, it has often been unilaterally. 
With its decision not to ratify the International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, the United States has placed itself outside of 
the United Nations core regime.49 Forsythe notes that as the Cov-
enant gains greater acceptance in the future, the United States may 
44 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 47. 
45 By 1990, 86 states, or 54% of those eligible, had become parties to the International 
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights; 38 states, or 23% of those eligible, have become 
parties to the optional protocol. Forsythe, supra note 3, at 58. 
46 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 109. 
47 [d. 
48 [d. 
49 [d. at 134-35. 
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remain outside still, but not by its own choice.50 And the United 
States cannot hope to "shape the functioning of the U.N. Human 
Rights Committee if it is not a party to the Civil and Political Rights 
Covenant. "51 
If the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights was 
ratified by the United States, it would be obligated to make at least 
some changes in federal and state law, a troubling notion to some. 52 
Interest groups, such as the American Bar Association, see inter-
national human rights instruments as a threat to the legal culture 
in the United States, and to "the foundational principles of feder-
alism and constitutionalism."53 Opponents to ratification also con-
tend that human rights are a matter of domestic jurisdiction, and 
that many of the rights protected by the Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights are regulated in the United States by the states and 
not by the federal government. 54 Finally, opponents argue that some 
provisions of the Covenant would conflict with the United States 
Constitution. 55 
Refusal by the United States to ratify the Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights has several effects. First, refusal to ratify has 
been seen as another example of United States arrogance.56 Second, 
the United States cannot use the document to bring a complaint 
against a state in violation of the Covenant.57 Third, refusal to ratify 
the Covenant deprives United States citizens the ability to invoke 
its provisions. 58 
Like many other state actors, the United States is often moti-
vated more by domestic economic and political factors than by 
human rights concerns. The events in China's Tiananmen Square 
offer an illustration. In its violent reaction to the student protests, 
the People's Republic of China violated the United Nations Charter 
and customary international law. The Chinese assertion of national 
50 Id. at 135. 
SlId. 
52 See Richard B. Lillich, United States Ratification of the United Nations Covenants, 20 GA. 
J. INT'L & COMPo L. 279,281 (1990). 
55 Winston P. Nagan, The Politics of Ratification: The Potential fur United States Adoption and 
Enfurcement of the Convention Against Torture, The Covenants on Civil and Political Rights and 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, 20 GA. J. INT'L & COMPo L. 311, 313 (1990). 
54 Thomas Buergenthal, The U.S. and International Human Rights, 9 HUM. RTS. L.J. 141, 
147-48 (1988). 
"Id. at 148-49. 
56 Lillich, supra note 52, at 284. 
"Id. 
58ld. at 284-85. 
1993] BOOK REVIEW 197 
emergency was questioned abroad, but little action was taken on an 
international level. 59 
The United States, after an initial, measured response to the 
events in Beijing,60 soon moved away from sanctions for economic 
and political reasons. In 1991, for example, President George Bush 
vetoed congressional efforts to add human rights conditions to 
China's Most-Favored-Nation Status.61 In other words, Chinese 
leaders quietly hoped for the events of Tiananmen to become a 
short-lived memory, and for all intents and purposes, their wish was 
granted. 
IV. CONCLUSION 
Ultimately, Forsythe offers optimism for increased attention to 
international human rights. The growing recognition and promo-
tion of human rights through the United Nations and non-govern-
mental actors, as well as model regime plans like the Council of 
Europe, are among the significant accomplishments of the past half-
century. Forsythe shows that there is reason to be hopeful, and 
echoes Zbigniew Brzezinski, President Jimmy Carter's national se-
curity advisor, who said that the idea of human rights is "the single 
most magnetic political idea of the contemporary time."62 
Forsythe advises more study of international human rights in 
United States colleges and universities. He believes law schools in 
the United States should adopt a curriculum similar to that of their 
European counterparts, where the role of law in society is studied 
as part of general education requirements.63 To this end, The Inter-
nationalization of Human Rights is an excellent starting point for the 
59 Many countries imposed economic sanctions upon China. See W. Gary Vause, Tibet to 
Tiananmen: Chinese Human Rights and United States Foreign Policy, 42 VAND. L. REV. 1575, 
1605-06 (1989). But some nations, like Japan, quickly resumed a "business-as-usual ap-
proach" to China following the incident at Tiananmen. INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 
4, at 120. 
60 See McCredie, supra note 30, at 240-43; see also William McGurn, The U.S. and China: 
Sanctioning Tiananmen Square, in THE BROKEN MIRROR: CHINA AFTER TIANANMEN 233, 233-
36 (George Hicks ed., 1990). 
61 See Keith Bradsher, Bush Vetoes Conditions on Trade Status o/China, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 
1992, at A7. After vetoing "The United States-China Act of 1991," President Bush said that 
limiting China's trade status would not encourage human rights reform, which he believed 
would best be accomplished through diplomatic pressure. Id. 
62 ZBIGNIEW BRZEZINSKI, THE GRAND FAILURE: THE BIRTH AND DEATH OF COMMUNISM 
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 256 (1989). 
63 INTERNATIONALIZATION, supra note 4, at 182. Forsythe characterizes U.S. law schools 
as "essentially vocational schools and hence not designed for the general study of law in 
society." /d. 
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student of human rights. Well-documented and incorporating a 
cross-disciplinary perspective, Forsythe's book surve}1s develop-
ments of the past fifty years with clarity and thoughtfulness. While 
the book may not address all of the questions currently posed by 
international human rights law, it does provide a path toward dis-
covering some of the answers. 
